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State failure or the weakening of state structures have invited an increasing number of 
third-party military interventions since the 1990s due to the security, political, and economic 
concerns these pose for the international order.  This study examines the impact of third-party 
military intervention on the political rights and civil liberties of the target country by drawing 
from the selectorate theory.  Specifically, it analyzes the impact of military intervention by 
examining the purpose of intervention, whether interveners acted unilaterally or not, and if 
nation-building was mandated.  Unbalanced Panel method is used to analyze data from 199 
countries from 1972 to 1999.  The findings show that under certain conditions military 
intervention enhances the political rights and civil liberties in target countries.  Specifically, if 
promotion of democracy is the aim of the intervention, and that democracies intervene 
multilaterally while engaging in nation-building; interventions lead to greater democratization.  
The evidence presented here suggests that military interventions are more effective in bringing 
about positive change in political rights when the interveners engage IGOs in nation-building of 
the target country.  In terms of civil liberties, the results of intervention are not as promising as 
with political rights.  The analysis shows that interventions, lead to lower level of civil liberties.  
This divergence between political rights and civil liberties as a result of third-party military 
intervention, perhaps, can be explained through greater emphasis that the international 
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In ‘The End of History’ Francis Fukuyama (1989) signifies “the end point of mankind’s 
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of 
human government.”  While many hailed Fukuyama’s premise of the superiority of Western 
liberalism and advocated it at the ‘point of bayonets,’ his caveats regarding the rise of 
nationalism and ethnic consciousness in post-Cold War era went almost unnoticed (Fukuyama 
2006).  The subsequent years witnessed an implosion of multiethnic states causing the 
weakening or outright failure of many states in the former Yugoslavia, Soviet Union, and Africa.  
State failure or the weakening of state structures have invited an increasing number of third-party 
military interventions since the 1990s due to the security, political, and economic concerns these 
pose for the international order.1  The U.S. alone has spent more than half a trillion dollars in the 
last 15 years to counter threats posed by the presence of failed or weak states (CRS Report for 
Congress 2007).  That money has been spent on military intervention to bring about regime 
change, to help stabilize countries coming out of civil war, and to initiate governance processes 
intended to lead to democracy (Fukuyama 2004).   
The existing research on the issue of military intervention and democratization diverges, 
with one group of studies arguing that intervention promotes democratization (Peceny 1999; 
Hermann and Kegley 1998, Gleditsch et al 2004), and the other body of studies finding no 
                                                 
1 For example, in Afghanistan the failure of the state resulted in the terrorist network Al-Qaeda being allowed to 
operate freely in both planning and executing terrorist acts.  In Somalia, warlords controlled the distribution of 
humanitarian aid and exacerbated the starvation of the people already suffering from a famine (Penglase and 
Méndez 1993).  In the Balkans1 there has been a weakening of state institutions as a result of endemic corruption 
present at all levels of government, poor governance, and selective enforcement of laws and imposition of order 
(Krastev 2002).  The weakening of the states in the Balkans has had an impact on European security through the 
presence of multinational criminal gangs who have used the Balkans as a transit point for drug smuggling from Asia 
to Europe, as a human trafficking hub, and unleashed hundreds of thousands of refugees on the doorsteps of Western 
Europe (Anastasijevic 2006; Ashley 2003). 
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correlation between intervention and democratization (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006; 
Hegre et al. 2001, Mansfield and Snyder 1995).  This increasing scholarship is limited in the 
examination of democratization induced by military intervention because: (1) in many cases it 
looks at U.S. interventions during the Cold War (Peceny 1995; Meernik 1996; Forsythe 1992), 
(2) it examines how the political character of the intervener shapes the political outcome of the 
target country (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006), (3) focuses on the regime type and their 
susceptibility to waging war (Maoz and Abdolali 1989), and (4) whether the use of force is an 
effective tool in promoting democratization (Meernik 1996).  These limitations make it more 
difficult to discern the complex relationship between democratization and intervention.2 
This study will evaluate the effects of third-party military intervention on the level of 
political rights and civil liberties by drawing from selectorate theory.  Specifically, it analyzes 
the impact of military intervention by examining the purpose of intervention, whether interveners 
acted unilaterally or not, and if nation-building was mandated.   Moreover, it expands the current 
body of empirical work by examining the entire universe of cases (199 countries in the period 
1972 to 1999). 
In order to address the issue of intervention and political rights and civil liberties, I 
structure the thesis into four segments.  First, I review the literature that has attempted to 
systematically examine the relationship between military interventions and level of political 
rights and civil liberties.  Second, I present a theoretical framework that accounts for the 
conditions that enable military intervention to enhance the level of political rights and civil 
liberties.  Third, I present the research design used to test my hypothesis.  Fourth, I use the data 
                                                 
2 The U.S. is not the only country that has engaged in 3rd-party interventions; interventions in the post-Cold War 
don’t take place for the same reasons as those during the Cold War. 
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to analyze the extent to which there is a change in the level of political rights and civil liberties 
as a result of military interventions.  Last, I offer a conclusion on my results as well as offer 
suggestions on future research pertaining to democratization of countries that are undergoing 
















Nation-building as a political concept has become very prominent in the post-Cold War 
era as a result of increasing international involvement in building or rebuilding nations that rose 
from the violent breakup of multiethnic states.  It is important to distinguish the organic 
evolution of nations from modern nation-building because the former is an autonomous process 
where nations develop over many years, while the latter is led by the international community 
and takes place rather abruptly.  What is nation-building?  Amitai Etzioni (2004) refers to nation 
building as: 
…forming a community where none previously existed, or shoring up one that was not 
firmly or properly constructed, or whose existence has been undermined, in many cases 
by war or inner strife.  
 
While underscoring the “necessity for rapid and fundamental societal transformation,” Andrew 
Rathmell (2005) goes even further, highlighting the essential need for the use of external military 
force to “engineer major social, political, and economic reconstruction” due to the inadequate 
domestic capacity to deal with the situation.  International involvement is inevitable and 
necessary to bring peace, jump-start the processes which will bring better government, a more 
stable state, economic and social development and a more constructive participation of the state 
in the international community (Talentino 2004; Jenkins, Elgar, and Plowden 2005).  
In essence, the modern process of nation-building consists of three segments: (1) the 
involvement of external actors through military intervention; (2) state-building under the 
guidance of international governmental organizations; and (3) the formation of a national identity 
out of disparate communities.  The inclusion of state-building and attempts to create a national 
identity in this process cause a definitional fallacy for “nation-building” as a concept.  Fukuyama 
(2004) explains the nature of this misconception based on the European view that holds that 
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nations cannot be socially engineered by outside forces, but that they organically evolve out of 
the social, economic, and political contexts, whereas the American perspective centers on the 
idea that the structure of political institutions determines the national identity that emerges, as 
reflected in the national experience of the U.S.  This paper will reflect the American perspective 
and will focus only on the first two segments of the nation-building process because the 
intervening country has the best prospects of influencing its military intervention and the 
subsequent state building in a third-country—whereas national identity emerges over centuries, 
and in contemporary times it can not be forced successfully on target population. 
The role of external actors engaged in systematic nation-building of other countries is not 
a recent phenomenon.  What distinguishes the involvement of outside powers in nation-building 
after the end of the Cold War is third-party military intervention.  The academic studies that have 
looked at the relationship between military intervention and democratization can be classified in 
the works of those who believe that: (1) military intervention is not conducive to democracy; and 
(2) military intervention promotes democracy.  Scholars who argue that military intervention is 
not conducive to democracy point out the failures in Haiti and Somalia as evidence of the 
inherent inability of democracies to promote democratization at the ‘point of bayonets.’  Bueno 
de Mesquita and Downs (2006) analyze military interventions from 1946 to 2001 and conclude 
that democracies are unable to positively impact democratization of the target country.  The 
authors attribute this failure to the political constraints that democratic leaders operate under and 
their necessity to promote a regime in the target country that will focus in executing interveners’ 
policies, thereby assuring their political survival with domestic constituencies.  Another group of 
scholars that subscribe to this position argue that democratization is a function of internal 
politics; some studies show that countries in transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes 
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are more likely to engage in war as a result of increased competition between different groups 
(Diamond, Linz, and Lipset 1989; Mansfield and Snyder 1995).  These results are echoed in a 
study by James Meernik (1996); he concludes that in 48% of cases the most frequent product of 
U.S. military intervention is no change whatsoever in the level of democratization (when 
examining the three-year period prior to and subsequent to intervention, and that increased 
democratization occurred only in 37% of the cases comparing the three-year pre and post-
intervention democratic averages).3  Although Meernik’s analysis questions the existence of a 
positive correlation between military intervention and democratization, the study confirms that 
countries that have experienced U.S. intervention are more likely to become democracies than 
those in which there was no military intervention.  
The proponents of the view that military intervention leads to democratization point to 
the successes of the U.S. in democratizing Germany and Japan after World War II, and Grenada 
and Panama more recently.  Studies by Peceny (1999), Herman and Kegley (1998), and 
Gleditsch, Christiansen, and Hegre (2004) conclude that military interventions are positively 
related to democratization in target countries especially if the U.S. adopts pro-liberalization 
polices such as free and fair elections, support for centrist parties and moderate interest groups, 
and promotion of human rights, or through declaratory policies by US presidents.4  In light of 
such arguments that democracies are able to bring peace and democracy through the use of arms, 
the question arises why are democracies more likely to promote democratization?  The most 
frequently used explanation, confirmed through numerous empirical studies, can be found in the 
democratic peace theory which suggests that democracies rarely fight one another and promote a 
                                                 
3 Meernik’s (1996) findings also show that there were a number of countries that experienced a movement away 
from democracy upon military intervention. 
4 When U.S. president openly states that the purpose of the intervention is to promote democratization. 
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decline in interstate conflicts.  (Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Lake 1992; Hegre et al 2001; Kegley 
and Hermann 1996).  Furthermore, the governments of the Group of Seven (G-7), the Clinton 
and George W Bush administrations, have proclaimed the promotion of democratization as 
pillars of foreign policy with the intent of enlarging the ‘community of democratic states’ and 
that military intervention should be a “prominent tool in the arsenal of democracy” (Kegley and 
Herman 1996; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Epstein, et al 2007). 
Academic studies that have explored the relationship between military intervention and 
democratization are not without their deficiencies.  Most studies have analyzed the relationship 
from the perspective of institutionalized democracy, ignoring the normative aspect of democracy 
characterized through high levels of political rights and civil liberties (Bueno de Mesquita and 
Downs 2006; Peceny 1999; Meernik 1996; Gleditsch et al 2004).  An analysis of the level of 
institutionalized democratization (as measured by Polity IV data) and political rights and civil 
liberties (as measured by Freedom House) shows that countries at the same level of institutional 
democratization will experience different levels of political rights and civil liberties.  This is 
particularly the case, in Egypt or Russia, that have adopted certain traits of democracies such as 
regular elections (electoral democracies) but where there is a very low tolerance of political 
opposition and limited civil liberties.5  The advancement of political rights and civil liberties by 
military interveners are foundational for the construction of the nation.  In cases where a nation 
did not exist previously (e.g. Kosovo, East Timor) or where the nation has faced civil war and is 
being rebuilt (e.g. Bosnia, Iraq) external actors bring about regime change and have the human 
capital, the financial resources, and the experience to engage in nation-building.  Additionally, 
                                                 
5 In 2004, both Russia and Egypt scored 6 (Political Rights) and 5 (Civil Liberties) according to Freedom House, 
whereas Polity IV gave a +7 score (democratic ranking) to Russia and a -6 score (autocratic ranking) to Egypt. 
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nation-building is needed so that the people can realize their political rights and civil liberties, 
and in cases where a segment of population is deprived of such rights and liberties, there will be 
institutions that will redress such discrimination.   
  Another deficiency in the current literature is the examination of military interventions 
only within the context of the Cold War despite the fact that the majority of interventions in the 
post-Cold War period were in promotion of democratization (Kegley and Herman 1996, Meernik 
1996, Peceny 1999).  A significant number of studies focus on U.S. military interventions, 
thereby ignoring not only all international interventions but failing to analyze the multilateral 
impact of interventions by democratic states (Meernik 1996, Tures 2005, Peceny 1999, Pei and 
Kasper 2003).  Cases studies from military interventions in the 1990s show that economic 
development, ethnic fragmentation, governance, and corruption are factors that influence the 
direction of democratization that occurs with nation-building (Hippler 2005; Von Hippel 2000).  
However, studies of military intervention and democratization have failed to control for many of 
these significant variables that impact the relationship.6  This study expands on the existing 
literature by analyzing all the states between 1972 and 1999.  Further, it examines the impact of 
military intervention on political rights and civil liberties in accordance with three criteria: (1) 
whether the intervention was during the Cold War or subsequently, (2) whether intervention was 
unilateral or multilateral, and (3) whether nation-building followed military intervention or not.    
 
                                                 
6 For a listing of control variables used by other studies that have examined the relationship between intervention 
and democratization see Appendix A. 
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Theory 
To explain the extent to which third-party military intervention affects political rights and 
civil liberties, I apply selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) which implies that a 
state’s policy choices are determined to a great degree by leader’s motivation to remain in office 
and the institutional context in which the leader operates.  The authors of the theory argue that all 
polities consist of a selectorate and a winning coalition in determining leadership.  The 
selectorate is defined as the ”set of people whose endowments include qualities or characteristics 
institutionally required to choose the government’s leadership and necessary for gaining access 
to private benefits doled out by the government’s leadership.”  The winning coalition is a 
segment of the selectorate” of sufficient size such that the subset’s support endows the leadership 
with political power over the remainder of the selectorate” (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003).  
Accordingly, democracies are made up of a large selectorate and a large winning coalition as a 
result of a nearly universal adult suffrage.  By contrast, non-democracies with rigged electoral 
systems have a large selectorate, whereas military juntas or autocratic monarchies rely on a small 
selectorate; however both types of non-democracies are characterized by a small winning 
coalition due to regime’s dependability on a fraction of the selectorate for political survival.7  
According to selectorate theory, the support of winning coalition is essential for an 
incumbent to remain in office.  The incentives that political leaders use in retaining or gaining 
the support of the winning coalition is a function of the ratio between resources and the size of 
the winning coalition.  In a small coalition, a political leader is able to reward its supporters with 
private goods (e.g. advantages in business transactions, kleptocracy, cronyism, rights to corrupt 
                                                 
7 Membership in a winning coalition is controlled on basis of personal origin, special proficiency, wealth, or gender 
or age (Bueno de Mesquita 2003). 
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practices, etc.).  As the size of the coalition increases, a leader with insufficient resources will 
switch to the promotion of public goods (e.g. social services, education, national security, etc.) 
and reduce the provision of private goods.8      
The Purpose of Third-Party Intervention 
 
During the Cold War, the West defined the containment of Communism as a public good 
due to the existential threat posed by the Soviet Union.  Accordingly, the U.S. and Western 
military interventions preceding the 1990s were tied to the provision of such public good.  
Interventions by democratic states during the Cold War, while capable of promoting 
democratization did not always do so when it was in their interest to support an illiberal regime 
that was anti-Communist, or a rebel movement seeking to overthrow an elected socialist 
government.  The suppression of electoral process and political pluralism as well as restrictions 
on freedom of expression, associational rights, and the rule of law by Western backed-regimes9 
are well documented and were explained through anti-Soviet rhetoric (Schmitz 2006).  In 
accordance with selectorate theory, the interveners in fact promoted in a target country a regime 
or an institutional context that was more responsive to the needs of the intervener than to the 
preferences of its people.  Consequently, in many countries, political rights and civil liberties 
were weakened upon third party intervention by a democracy (Meernik 1996, Forsythe 1992).   
 Concerning third-party military intervention, private goods are defined in terms of 
territorial acquisition, exploitable resources, foreign aid, or prestige.  Soviet interventions were 
characterized mostly with the spread of Communism, while other autocratic interventions, 
                                                 
8 In economics, public goods are defined as goods whose consumption by one group does not diminish the 
availability and the consumption by other groups.  Private goods are considered excludable and rivalrous. 
9 Congo 1965-1990, Indonesia 1965-1990, South Vietnam 1965-1975, Greece 1967-1974, Chile 1973-1990, Iran 
1954-1979, Nicaragua 1933-1979, El Salvador 1980-1987, South Africa 1981-1990, Philippines 1972-1986 
(Schmitz 2006). 
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especially in Africa, were more resource exploitation oriented.  Interventions by autocratic states, 
by default will not yield a pluralistic political system where rights and liberties figure 
prominently due to the absence of such values within the intervener.  Moreover, interveners fear 
that any democratization may lead to a nationalist movement that may resist the exploitation of 
its natural resources by the intervener, or that may demand the withdrawal of foreign forces from 
its soil.  Upon intervention, autocracies also establish and promote a puppet regime that will 
supply a political context that is responsive to interveners’ policies.  
With the changing political and security landscape upon the fall of the Soviet block, the 
containment of Communism through the sponsorship of illiberal regimes stopped being viewed 
as a public good.  Instead, the 1990s are exemplified by the Western promotion of 
democratization and its characterization as a public good as a result of several convergent ideas: 
(1) the rise in interventions in defense of human rights (Ottaway 2003);10 (2) the adoption of a 
more post-modern view of the world by democracies (Ingelhart 1997);11 (3) the need for 
expanding the free markets to other countries; and (4) threats to international peace and security 
posed by failed or weak states.  Bueno de Mesquita and others argue that it is likely for 
democracies to promote the establishment of an autocracy with a smaller winning coalition in 
order for the target state to enable the intervener to achieve its goals.  In contrast, I contend that 
in the post-Cold War period, in the absence of an autocratic superpower, democracies are less 
likely to promote an autocracy because of the demands of constituencies that their state’s foreign 
                                                 
10 Western publics’ demand and support of military interventions in places such as Bosnia and Kosovo to stop 
genocide. 
11 Ingelhart’s post-modernization theory stresses that with greater globalization, people undergo a change in values 
in adopting more progressive and liberal views. 
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policy must promote greater political rights and civil liberties in other countries.12  It is 
contradictory and unlikely for the intervener to promote policies in the target country that led to 
its intervention in the first place.  
Hypothesis 1: Military interventions during the Cold War were less likely to lead to 
promotion of political rights and civil liberties than those interventions occurring in the 
post-Cold War era. 
Forms of Intervention: Unilateral versus Multilateral 
 
The selectorate theory can be further utilized to explain the forms of military intervention 
undertaken by democracies and autocracies during and after the Cold War.  The form that the 
third-party intervention takes depends on the agenda that the intervener hopes to accomplish.  As 
a result, agendas depend on the size of the winning coalition.  Coalitions featured in autocracies 
will have a narrower agenda associated with the extraction of rents as a result of intervention and 
are not concerned with the long-term internal affairs of target countries because of high financial 
costs associated with it and leaders’ unwillingness to divert resources to the target country 
(Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006).  Considering the limited number of policymakers 
involved in setting the agenda for an autocratic intervention, it can be expected that it will be a 
focused agenda, biased in its outlook, and more difficult to correct if the intervention is faced 
with any unexpected terms. Consequently, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004) show that autocrats 
set a level of effort at the outset of the war and will not increase their resolve dramatically  in 
terms of additional resources if the war progresses poorly. 
                                                 
12 The absence of political rights and civil liberties especially within weak or failed states poses a threat to the 
international community as a whole; intrastate wars, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and terrorism, threaten the peace 
and the security of the international order, and have given rise to international involvement in engaging in nation-
building as means of building a sustainable state that is democratic. 
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 Contrarily, larger winning coalitions present in democracies accentuate diverse agendas.  
Since democracies prefer to intervene in concert with other countries in order to enhance their 
legitimacy, spread the costs, and complement one-another in expertise, their modus operandi is 
multilateral intervention.  In such interventions, the selectorate and the winning coalition are not 
only very large but also eclectic due to the large number of countries that are members of the 
intervening coalition – this leads to divergent agendas.  The 2003 invasion of Iraq typifies the 
different agendas that coalition members promote.13  The divergent agendas and winning 
coalitions are bound together by the provision of a public good that is the lowest common 
denominator to all coalition members, promotion of political rights and civil liberties (Bueno de 
Mesquita and Downs 2006).  If a country deems that its participation in military intervention will 
not yield any public goods for its winning coalition, it is unable to join or to support such an 
operation; if a country is a party to the intervention it could withdraw its support if its selectorate 
has redefined the public good in terms that the coalition is unable to provide.14 
Autocracies are more likely than democracies to engage in unilateral interventions in 
search of rent-seeking opportunities in order to reward their winning coalitions and secure their 
political standing.  Nonetheless, democracies at times have acted unilaterally as well in order to 
preempt a threat to national interest or when timely intervention was perceived to be of 
essence.15  Unilateral interventions during the Cold War frequently failed to advance political 
                                                 
13 Whereas, the U.S. reasoned that intervention occurred in defense of its national security, some EU coalition 
members viewed the invasion within the realm of democratization, while others participated to gain different favors 
with the U.S. in what is described as “the Coalition of the Billing” (McClure 2003). 
14 One of the central themes of why the Spanish and Italian selectorate voted out of the office the center-right 
governments revolved around the perception that their troops had no business in Iraq, when it became known that 
there were no real national security threats to them, as argued by the Bush and Blair administrations. 
15 In Bosnia, preceding NATO intervention, the dual-key between NATO and UN had a terrible effect because it 
bought time for Serbs to engage in ethnic cleansing.  Every time NATO deemed it appropriate to intervene in order 
to stop Serb atrocities, the UN’s Special Envoy Asushi Akashi vetoed the intervention based on claims that the Serbs 
are willing to sign a ceasefire and work toward a negotiated solution.   
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rights and civil liberties because many target countries were client-states of the USSR and the 
concern that intervention may up the ante with the Soviets (Von Hippel 2000).  While the fall of 
the Soviet empire removed “Soviet patronage of illiberal regimes” as a barrier to liberalization of 
oppressive countries, unilateral interventions by democracies continue to be less successful in 
promoting political rights and civil liberties because of other factors:  (1) the intervener maybe 
viewed as partial to the conflict by some parties—this can lead to a great deal of distrust for the 
peace process advocated by the intervening force; (2) the intervener’s favoritism of one actor or 
a group of parties to the detriment of others leave the excluded (e.g. Sunnis in Iraq) to seek 
influence through violent means; (3) the perceived illegitimacy of unilateral interventions may 
lead the rival parties to continue and even escalate the conflict in hopes that the intervener will 
withdraw. 
  Additionally, in politically sensitive regions of the world multilateral intervention serves 
as “check and balance” on the power of individual interveners and provides oversight on the 
peace process that emanates from the military intervention.  This aspect of multilateralism is best 
illustrated in cases of multilateral intervention by the UN, where democracies and non-
democracies collectively provide military forces and political capital.  In such interventions, 
there are compromises that enable both sets of countries to present to their winning coalition a 
public or a private good.16   
Hypothesis 2: Multilateral interventions by democracies are more likely to positively 
impact political rights and civil liberties than unilateral interventions. 
                                                 
16 For example, in case of NATO-Russia intervention in Kosovo, democratic constituencies were provided with a 
public good that was defined in terms of prevention of genocide and reversal of ethnic cleansing, while Russia was 
able to reason to their constituency that Russia’s involvement was in defense of their brethren, the Serbs, as well as 
it was awarded the contract to purchase Naftna Industrija Srbije (Serb Oil Industry). 
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Instruments Used in Promoting Political Rights and Civil Liberties 
 
Unilateral intervention is a rather rudimentary form of intervention due to its major 
reliance on military force as a behavior correction instrument.  Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2004) 
suggest that victorious autocrats are interested in extracting wealth from the target country 
following military intervention and are not preoccupied with incurring additional costs by 
modifying the target’s political institutions.  Citizens of the occupied country that face the same 
burdens as with the old autocratic regime have no incentives in raising the cost for the new 
autocratic (puppet) administration; this allows autocrats not to spend as much in maintaining the 
postwar settlement, and as the Bueno de Mesquita et al (2004) study shows, postwar 
expenditures by autocracies return to peacetime levels more quickly.  While unilateral 
interventions maybe successful in establishing a regime that is responsive to the intervener’s 
interests, they are often unable to positively transform the target country because of their 
inability to address the contentious issues that brought about the conflict.17  This incapacity 
results from several sources: the lack of international legitimacy for the intervention; 
international law constrains the intervener as an occupying force from making radical changes to 
the legal system; limited resources (money, time, political capital, expertise).  Interventions 
preceding the 1990s did not rely on any nation-building outside the “development and 
modernization” perspective which viewed political and civil liberalization as an evolutionary 
process.  The foreign aid given by the intervener to the client for development and modernization 
was often squandered by corrupt leaders and bureaucrats who considered such aid an entitlement 
                                                 
17 The inability of unilateral intervention to address such issues leads “half of the countries emerging from conflict 
[to] revert to violence within five years” (Belloni 2007). 
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for creating or enhancing the government structures that enabled the successful execution of the 
interveners’ policies (Boone 1996). 
On the other hand, multilateral intervention is more complex in that military force is only 
one of the tools available to the interveners.  In addition to military intervention, another major 
instrument of the international community in dealing with failed states is nation-building.  
Taking into account that nation-building is a lengthy endeavor, the interveners involve 
international governmental organizations (IGOs) when their winning coalition does not want to 
bear the highs costs associated with the necessary political, economic, and social reconstruction.   
The use of IGOs in the post-military intervention in addition to contributing resources 
and expertise may also act as a blame deflector for the interveners to explain mission failure to 
their winning coalitions.  Interveners can argue that military intervention achieved its objectives 
of removing from power an illiberal and an oppressive regime, but that subsequent failures in the 
political and economic reconstruction of the target state are due to failures of the IGOs.  
Considering that democracies usually prevail in military interventions intended for regime 
change, the U.S., as the world’s only superpower, is a substantial contributor of military forces to 
many multilateral interventions.  Nonetheless, in order to insulate itself from criticism if nation-
building fails, in many instances the U.S. stays on the periphery of the nation-building process 
acting mostly in an advisory capacity to the UN, EU, or the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) who are given the lead role in the post-intervention period.18  
Third-party military interventions are plagued with “rival agency” problems, as suggested 
by selectorate theory, where the leaders of the new democracy in order to provide public goods 
                                                 
18 In military interventions that involve U.S. troops on the ground, the U.S. has reserved for itself the overall military 
command of the intervention.  However, once military objectives have been achieved, the U.S. allows the UN, the 
EU or other IGOs to take the lead in nation-building processes as witnessed in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, East 
Timor.  
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to their constituencies may come into conflict with the interveners’ policies whose responsibility 
is to his or her constituencies.  In the 1990s, in order to diminish the “rival agency” problems, 
democratic interveners have promoted international protectorates as a means of controlling the 
nation-building process and ensuring the flow of public goods to their public.  Following military 
intervention, the international community through some mechanism (e.g. UNMIK in Kosovo, or 
the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq) retains the highest level of authority and 
competencies while the political, economic, and social reconstruction can achieve a degree of 
irreversible sustainability.  On the political front, IGOs have been tasked with the reformation of 
governmental structures according to liberal principles through the promotion of free and fair 
elections, the advancement of political parties, the nurturing of a civic society, and the training of 
the judiciary and police services (Jones et al 2005).  In terms of economic reconstruction, 
institutions such as World Bank and IMF have worked in transition of the centralized economy 
to a free market economy through privatization of state-owned enterprises, reconstruction and 
modernization of infrastructure, and have financed the manufacturing and trade segments of the 
economy (World Bank 1998).  National reconciliation and the emergence of a new national 
identity is directed through the promotion of truth and reconciliations commissions, inter-ethnic 
dialogue, and decentralization schemes that give the highest form of self-governance to 
minorities (Flournoy and Pan 2002).  
Hypothesis 3: Multilateral interventions that are followed-up with nation-building are 
more likely to lead to a state that advances political rights and civil liberties than 
interventions that do not entail nation-building. 
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Research Design  
To test these hypotheses, I examine the effect of third-party military intervention on 
political rights and civil liberties between 1972 and 1999 using a large-n statistical analysis.  The 
start date for the data is determined by the fact that Freedom House began to track the status of 
political rights and civil liberties in 1972.  The end date for the period under analysis is bound by 
the availability of third-party intervention data as compiled by Regan (2002).  The dataset 
includes 199 states19 with 49 separate cases of interventions (237 country-years) occurring 
during the said period.  Accordingly, I am able to compare the change in political rights and civil 
liberties due to military intervention with those countries that have experienced an improvement 
in such rights and liberties in the absence of intervention.  The unit of analysis is the country-
year.  
Dependent Variables:  
 
Political rights and civil liberties as measured by Freedom House have been used in the 
past as indicators of democratization (Knack 2004; Kegley Jr and Herman 1996).  I use data 
collected annually by Freedom House beginning in 1972.  The available data allows the measure 
of trends in political rights and civil liberties during both the Cold War and post-Cold War 
periods.  The significance of these particular political rights and civil liberties data lies in the fact 
that they measure the normative aspect of democratization—the rights and liberties afforded to a 
country’s citizens. 
                                                 
19 199 is the sum total of countries that existed during 1972-1999.  It does not mean that there are 199 countries in 
the world at any one point in time.  There are several countries that either separated or united during this period.  
Such countries are counted and measured individually (e.g. Germany, West Germany, and East Germany). 
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Political Rights: are measured on a scale of 1 to 7 based on a checklist of 10 questions that are 
grouped into three categories: Electoral Process (3 questions), Political Pluralism and 
Participation (4 questions), and Functioning of Government (3 questions).  
Civil Liberties: are measured on a scale from 1 to 7 based on a checklist of 15 questions that are 
grouped into four categories: Freedom of Expression and Belief (4 questions), Associational and 
Organizational Rights (3 questions), Rule of Law (4 questions), and Personal Autonomy and 
Individual Rights (4 questions).   
In the Freedom House measures, higher scores indicate fewer rights and liberties20, so for the 
purposes of this analysis the scales have been reversed such that higher scores imply greater 
rights and liberties. 
Independent Variables 
 
Third-party military interventions in intra-state conflicts are defined “as convention 
breaking21 military…activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the 
authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between 
the government and opposition forces” (Regan 2002).  Data on third party interventions are 
taken from Regan (2002).  In terms of military interventions, this research allows for 
estimation of the level of political rights/civil liberties difference among four different groups 
of countries: 1) countries that experienced “Interventions in the post-Cold War”; 2) countries 
that experienced “Non-interventions in the post-Cold War”; 3) countries that experienced 
“Interventions in the Cold War”; and 4) countries that experienced “Non-interventions in the 
                                                 
20 Freedom House rates countries with a score of 1 or 2 as “free;” those with a score of 3, 4, or 5 as “partly free;” and 
those with a score of 6 or 7 as “not free.” 
21 Regan (2002) uses the term “convention breaking” to discriminate between the normal course of international 
influence and intervention.  
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Cold War.”  The base group consists of those countries that experienced interventions in the 
post-Cold War.  The variables are dummy variables coded “1” to indicate the presence of each 
type of intervention and “0” otherwise.   
Multilateral Intervention: is a dummy variable reflecting whether the intervention was 
undertaken by a number of countries acting in concert.  The variable assumes the value of “1” 
if multilateral intervention takes place and “0” otherwise.   
Unilateral Intervention: is a dummy variable reflecting whether the intervention was 
undertaken by a single country.  The variable assumes the value of “1” if unilateral 
intervention takes place and “0” otherwise.   
Democratic Interveners: is a dummy variable reflecting whether the intervention was undertaken 
by a democracy or not.  The variable assumes the value of “1” if intervention by democracies 
takes place and “0” otherwise.  Only countries with Polity IV scores of +6 obtained in the same 
year as the intervention are treated as democratic interveners.  The annual level of democracy in 
the Polity IV dataset is computed by subtracting the ‘autocracy’ score from the ‘democracy’ 
score resulting in a unified polity scale that ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 
(strongly autocratic).   
Other Interveners: is a dummy variable reflecting whether the intervention was undertaken by a 
non-democracy or not.  The variable assumes the value of “1” if intervention by a non-
democracy takes place and “0” otherwise.  Countries with Polity IV scores below 6 obtained in 






Prior experiences with democracy are likely to enhance the prospects of speedier and 
deeper democratization in the aftermath of a military intervention (Dobbins et al 2003; Etzioni 
2004).  To account for countries’ previous experiences with democratic institutions, out of Polity 
IV data I create the variable Base Democratization +10.  This variable aggregates the scores for 
the 10 year period prior to the intervention.22  Thus, the minimum and maximum scores for the 
variable are -100 (full autocracy) to +100 (full democracy).  
GDP per capita: some scholars believe that economic development facilitates democratization 
(Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Lipset 1959).  In order to control for this possibility, Gross 
Domestic Product per capita is used as an indicator of economic development.  The annual GDP 
per capita data in current U.S. dollars are from the UN Statistics Division–Database (2007).   
Ethnic Fragmentation: in modernization theory ethnicity is viewed as a marginal phenomenon 
that would gradually disappear with political development (Kymlicka 2000; Connor 1972).  
However, the experiences from ethnic conflicts in the past 20 years are a testament to the idea 
that the lack of a homogeneous population can exacerbate the intensity of conflict. Additionally, 
the scars of ethnic conflict can complicate nation-building efforts as warring parties are 
apprehensive of reconciliation.  Ethnic fragmentation is defined as the proportion of the largest 
ethnic group as a percentage of the country’s population.  This data is taken from Regan (2002) 
but is originally compiled by Ellingsen (2000) and is based on the average score of data taken 
from 3 separate sources: Handbook of the Nations, Britannica Book of the Year, and 
Demographic Yearbook. 
                                                 
22 Baseline level of democracy +10 is calculated for each data point for the entire period, 1972-1999.  Thus to 
calculate the level of democracy in 1972, I sum the scores for 1962-1971; for 1982, I sum the score for 1972-1981; 
for 1999, I sum the scores for 1989-1998. 
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State Failure: failed states are accompanied by low levels of political rights and civil liberties as 
a consequence of states experiencing civil strife, political corruption, economic collapse, human 
rights abuses, societal degradation (Langford 1999).  Weak or failed states pose increasing risks 
to global security as a source of terrorism, narcotics trade, weapons proliferation and organized 
crime (Krasner and Pascual 2005).  According to the Political Instability Task Force (2007) there 
are four distinct types of state failure: (1) revolutionary wars; (2) ethnic wars; (3) adverse regime 
changes; and (4) genocides and politicides.  The first three types of state failure are measured on 
three alternative scales and are represented through an average score (range 0-4; or 1-4).  The 
fourth type is measured on a single scale of 0-5.  I combine the four types of state failure into one 
continuous variable ‘State Failure’ that represents the sum total of the average scores measured 
by each type of state failure, and takes the range of 0 to 17. 
Post-Cold War: a dummy variable denoting whether the intervention occurred during the Cold 
War.  It takes the value of “0” for Cold War years, and a value of “1” for post-Cold War years.  
Following Patrick Regan (2000), I consider the Cold War to have ended in January 1989.  
Nation-Building: a dummy variable denoting whether nation-building takes place.  It takes the 
value of “0” if no nation-building occurred, and a value of “1” if nation-building has occurred.  I 
have compiled a dataset of nation-building missions by examining all UN and OSCE missions 
occurring during the 1972-1999 period—and treating as nation-building missions only those 
missions that have a political reconstruction component.23  To account for nation-building 
missions undertaken on unilateral basis by the US or UK, I rely on data compiled by Payne 
(2006). 
                                                 
23 Not all UN/OSCE missions are classified as nation-building missions.  Those UN/OSCE missions that dealt with 
monitoring of borders, the withdrawal of foreign forces, or ensuring ceasefires are in place were not considered as 




Multiple regressions are employed for the examination of the effect of third-party 
military intervention on the political rights and civil liberties because of its ability to control for 
other variables that may impact the stated relationship and since it can incorporate general 
functional form relationships (Wooldridge 2006). The method used for the multivariate analysis 
is the Unbalanced Panel using Generalized Least Squares while adjusting for heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation.  This method is used in consideration of its ability to mix the characteristics 
of both cross-sectional and time-series data which is important to deal with “intertemporal 
dynamics and the individuality of the entities” under investigation (Dielman 1983).  One of the 
advantages of panel data statistical technique is the use of pooled time series and cross sectional 
data in generating a larger number of degrees of freedom, safeguarding against misspecification 
bias resulting from the use of only cross-sectional or time series data, greater variation, and 
remedying some multicollinearity and aggregation problems (Brobst and Gates 1977).   
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of third-party interventions for the entire period 
under study (1972-1999).  At the country-year (cy) level, I account for a total of 237 (cy) of 
third-party military interventions, of which 129 occurred during the Cold War (1972-1988) and 
108 since the end of it (1989-1999).  In order to compare the interventions across different 
categories and periods, I have calculated the mean number of interventions.  Table 1 shows that 
preceding the 1990s, on average there were 7.59 interventions per year (ipy).  The end of the 





Table 1: Characteristics of Third-Party Military Interventions 1 (the unit of analysis is 
country-year) 




















Cold War 129 (7.59) 82 (4.82) 47 (2.76) 39 (2.29) 52 (3.06) 38 (2.24) 
Post-Cold 
War 
108 (9.82) 57 (5.18) 51 (4.64) 32 (2.91) 10 (0.91) 66 (6.00) 
Total 237 139 98 71 62 104 
 
When comparing different forms of intervention (unilateral vs. multilateral), the data shows that 
unilateral interventions did not increase significantly (7%) in the post-Cold War period, from 
4.82 to 5.18 ipy, while multilateral interventions increased by 68% from 2.76 to 4.64 ipy in the 
1990s.  When analyzing the regime types of the interveners, Table 1 shows that democracies 
have increased the rate of interventions from 2.29 to 2.91 ipy in the post-Cold War era, whereas 
autocracies have significantly reduced their interventions from 3.06 to 0.91 ipy, a 70% reduction.  
The post-Cold War period has seen significant growth in coalition interventions that bring 
together democracies and non-democracies (a 168% increase).      
Table 2 lists the average number of interventions undertaken by countries of varying 
regimes acting unilaterally or multilaterally as well nation building efforts, from 1972 to 1999.  
Table 2 shows that in the post-Cold War era democracies have increased the rate of unilateral 
interventions from 2.00 (Cold War) to 2.82 ipy, a 41% increase.  At the same time, when 
necessary to act in concert with other nations, democracies have had a hard time of creating a 
coalition consisting of all democracies.  As such we see this drop in multilateral interventions by 
an all democratic coalition from 0.29 to 0.09 ipy.  The end of Cold War era has kept autocracies 
disengaged to great lengths from meddling in the affairs of other states.   
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Cold War (2.00) / (0.29) (2.29) / (0.76) (0.53) / (1.71) 
Post-Cold War (2.82) / (0.09) (0.64) / (0.27) (1.73) / (4.27) 
Change in Rate (41%) / (-69%) (-72%) / (-64%) (226%) / (150%) 
 
Consequently we see a decrease in interventions by autocracies whether unilaterally or 
multilaterally.  Furthermore, the analysis presented in Table 2 show that countries that are not 
fully democratic or autocratic have increased their rates of unilateral interventions from 0.53 to 
1.73 ipy.   
Additionally, it is interesting to note that coalitions consisting of democracies and non-
democracies (e.g. UN missions) have experienced a significant increase as well, from 1.71 to 
4.27 ipy in the 1990s. This is of interest because while multilateral interventions (e.g. Iraq, 
Afghanistan)  that include a few irrelevant non-democracies are considered as necessary to lend 
legitimacy to the intervention, those interventions (e.g. Bosnia, Kosovo) that include powerful 
non-democracies such as Russia are likely generate long-term instability in target country.  This 
instability results as compromises are made in order for the interveners to meet the demands of 
their respective winning coalitions.  Betts (1994) lists 5 tasks that the interveners must consider 
before using military intervention to achieve political objectives24—failures in considering such 
tasks are best illustrated by cases of Bosnia and Kosovo.25     
                                                 
24 (1) Recognize that to make peace is to decide who rules-the ambivalence to the final political outcomes lead to 
political decentralization that is unsustainable; (2) Avoid half-measures—intervention led to the creation of new 
borders and a multitude of political power centers ; (3) Do not confuse peace with justice—impartiality to the 
conflict created resentment among the victims and rewarded the aggressor; (4) Do not confuse balance with peace or 
justice—not allowing the emergence of a victor or identifying the defeated, local competitors live to die another day; 
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The data reveals that that there were 36 cases of nation-building that took place between 
1972 and 1999.  In 29 instances nation-building was led by the UN or OSCE, whereas in 7 
countries it took place by the U.S. or UK—this translates into 160 cy of nation-building with 34 
cy occurring during the Cold War and 126 cy thereafter.  During the Cold War, nation-building 
took place on average at 2 missions per year, whereas it has flourished to 11 missions per year 
since the end of the Cold War. 
Table 3 includes five panel data models which separately measure the impact of third-
party military intervention along with variables that control for the characteristics of political 
rights.  Model 1 is the simplest in that it measures the impact of military intervention on political 
rights relative to countries that have not experienced intervention.  Models 2, 3, and 4 are set up 
to test hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, respectively, whereas Model 5 includes all the variables from the 
previous four models.  Positive coefficients imply an increase in political rights, whereas 
negatively signed coefficients indicate a decrease in political rights. 
In affirmation of previous research conducted by Dobbins (2003), and Etizioni (2004), 
the analysis shows that prior democratization is a factor that is positively related to political 
rights and is significant.  Additionally, the analysis confirms that economic development 
facilitates greater political rights and is statistically significant, as indicated in the study of 
Przeworski and Limongi (1997). Furthermore, Table 3 shows that state failure and post-Cold 
War period are not conducive to greater political rights as attested by the significance of the 
findings.   
                                                                                                                                                             
and (5) Make humanitarian interventions military rational—the placing of pro-Serb interveners to secure Serb held 
areas provided a gestation for further separatism. 
25 Compromises that must be reached between US and Russia can have an impact not only in target countries but 
also in other parts of the world as exemplified by American ignorance of Chechnya in the 1990s in return for 
Russian support in Bosnia, and the intervention of Russia in South Ossetia in 2008 in a manner that NATO 
intervened in Kosovo in 1999.  
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Observations 3620 3620 3620 3620 3620 
Number of countries 139 139 139 139 139 
Standard errors in parentheses; 1-tailed test      




Ethnic fragmentation and UN missions have a negative influence, while nation-building in and of 
itself yields to a positive relationship with the political rights.  However, all three variables are 
statistically insignificant.  
In Models 1-5, I test whether military intervention in general leads to greater political 
rights compared to no intervention.  The results show that countries that have experienced 
military intervention are not likely to witness an improvement in political rights.  Model 2 tests 
Hypothesis 1 which states that interventions in the post-Cold War lead to greater political rights.  
The results show that the Cold War period was more conducive to political rights than the post-
Cold War.  If we hold all other variables fixed, relative to interventions in the post-Cold War, 
interventions during the Cold War are associated with an increase in political rights, albeit the 
correlation is not significant.  However, those countries that did not experience intervention 
during the Cold War are more likely to experience greater political rights—this relationship is 
statistically significant.  Model 3 is setup to test Hypothesis 2 which states that multilateral 
interventions by democracies yield to greater political rights in the target country.  The results of 
this model indicate that relative to multilateral interventions by democracies, interventions by 
non-democracies (unilateral or multilateral) are negatively associated with political rights.  The 
results of Model 4 show that while holding all other variables fixed, multilateral intervention that 
is not coupled with nation-building is negatively associated with political rights, relative to 
multilateral interventions that engage IGOs in nation-building, and that the relationship is 
significant at the 95% confidence level.  This relationship between the two variables is affirmed 
by the results of the fully specified Model 5.  Greater political rights in the presence of nation-
building are likely because of the enhanced legitimacy of the intervention, decreased willingness 
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of individual parties to take on the international community, greater regional reconciliation, the 
increased pool of expertise, and lower financial strains on individual countries (Dobbins 2003). 
Table 4 shows the results of multivariate regressions of third-party military intervention 
on civil liberties.  Again, I employ 5 panel data models to test the impact and the significance of 
interventions on civil liberties while controlling for several other variables.  As with political 
rights, in all five models, prior democratization, GDP per capita and state failure display the 
same direction of the relationship and are statistically significant.  Unlike the political rights 
models, the post-Cold War period and increased ethnic fragmentation have been associated with 
greater civil liberties as attested by the statistical significance of the relationships.  Nation-
building that has taken place by the IGOs in the absence of third-party interventions is positively 
correlated with increased civil liberties.    
Countries that have experienced military interventions are less likely to witness greater 
civil liberties as indicated by the significance of the results of Model 1, compared to countries 
that have encountered no intervention. Hypothesis 1 states that interventions in the post-Cold 
War lead to greater civil liberties than interventions that tool place during the Cold War.  The 
results from Model 2 which is set-up to test Hypothesis 1 contradict these expectations in a 
statistically significant relationship—relative to intervention in the post-Cold War, those 
countries that were not a target of an intervention experienced increasing levels of civil liberties 
in.  Model 3 is setup to test Hypothesis 2 which states that multilateral interventions by 
democracies lead to greater civil liberties than unilateral interventions in the target country.  The 
results of this model indicate that there is no clear relationship between interventions by non-
democracies (whether unilateral or multilateral) and enhanced civil liberties.   
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On the other hand, relative to multilateral interventions by democracies, unilateral interventions 
by democratic countries are not conducive to greater civil liberties as attested by the statistical 
significance.  The results of Model 4 show that relative to multilateral interventions coupled with 
nation-building, unilateral interventions irrespective of nation-building are negatively associated 
with civil liberties—the relationship is significant.   
Military interventions appear to have conflicting effects on political rights and civil 
liberties, while multilateral interventions coupled with nation-building is positively associated 
with greater political rights, they are not positively related to enhanced civil liberties.  This 
dichotomy on the influence of intervention could be explained in terms of the political 
reconstruction of the target country upon intervention.  Since intra-state conflict in most cases is 
to ethnic, racial, or religious fragmentation, political reconstruction of the state that occurs as 
part of nation-building emphasizes collective political rights of groups to the detriment of 
individual liberties.  In order to eliminate the causes of violence and state failure, one of the 
priorities of external actors has been the creation of self-governing political entities that enable 
decentralization of power and the promotion of democratic mechanisms that would eliminate the 
ability of majority to dictate to or act in contradiction to the interests of other groups.26 
 These mixed results suggest that the answer to the question whether third-party military 
intervention leads to greater political rights and civil liberties in a target country is not 
straightforward.  The null findings emanating from testing Hypothesis 1 and 2 support the 
conclusions arrived by the studies of Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006), Pei and Kasper 
                                                 
26 International community in Bosnia created the statelet of Republika Srpska as a means of satisfying Serb 
aspiration for independence.  In Kosovo, the UN has devised the Ahtisaari Plan which creates new municipalities for 
the Serb population and allows such municipalities to have direct relations with Serbia.  This plan further gives the 
Serbs the right of veto in any matter that Serbs deem it in their national interest. 
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(2004), and Forsythe (1992) that military intervention does not lead to democratization because 
democratic interveners promote regimes in target countries that are responsive primarily to the 
intervener’s interests.  Such assertions are rather qualified considering that these studies measure 
the impact of military intervention in and of itself; they do not measure whether the intervener 
has actively engaged and promoted the necessary building blocks associated with 
democratization.   
The results presented in this paper show that when multilateral interventions are followed 
up with active engagement of IGOs in nation-building, political rights are more likely to be 
enhanced.  Such findings affirm studies by Peceny (1999), Meernik(1996) and Herman and 
Kegeley (1998) that interventions do lead to democratization when interveners are oriented 












In the aftermath of the Cold War, while there has been a significant reduction in inter-
state conflicts, the international system has witnessed an increase in the number of intra-state 
conflicts as a result of state failure.27  While non-democracies have not been as involved in third-
party military intervention in the post-Cold War era, interventions by democracies in failed or 
weak states, due to the threat that such states pose to the international order, have become more 
prominent since the fall of the Soviet Union.  This paper argues that under certain conditions 
military intervention enhances the political rights and civil liberties in target countries.  
Specifically, if promotion of democracy is the aim of the intervention, and that democracies 
intervene multilaterally while engaging in nation-building; interventions lead to greater 
democratization.  The evidence presented here suggests that military interventions are more 
effective in bringing about positive change in political rights when the interveners engage IGOs 
in nation-building of the target country.  The success is likely due to the political reforms, 
economic development, and national reconciliation that IGOs promote.  In terms of civil 
liberties, the results of intervention are not as promising as with political rights.  The analysis 
shows that interventions, lead to lower level of civil liberties.  This divergence between political 
rights and civil liberties as a result of third-party military intervention can be explained through 
greater emphasis that the international community places on collective rights of ethnic, racial, or 
religious groups than on individual liberties as a means of ensuring non-discrimination, equal 
protection, and enhanced political rights.  This is achieved through the promotion of various 
political models: consociationalism, regional autonomy, decentralization, and ethnic separation. 
                                                 
27 According to Von Hippel (2000), between 1990 and 1996 there were 98 armed conflicts, of which only 7 were 
between states. 
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This study builds upon the work of others who have examined the impact of military 
intervention on democratization in several ways.  Focusing on political rights and civil liberties 
allows us to study the impact of intervention on the normative aspect of democratization.  
Additionally, it provides for another measure of democratization since many countries that are 
known as ‘electoral democracies’ have adopted certain traits of democracies such as regular 
elections, but where there is a low level of tolerance of meaningful political opposition and 
limited civil liberties.  Moreover, the study not only examines the role of intervention during the 
Cold War but also in its aftermath, while testing for the impact that unilateral and multilateral 
interventions by a range of countries by democracies and non-democracies have on political 
rights and civil liberties.  Finally, it looks at the direction of the relationship by controlling for 
socio-economic-political factors that are known to have an impact on democratization. 
Future research regarding the impact of intervention on democratization should augment 
the analysis in at least three ways.  First, continuous data should be used instead of dummy 
variables in order to arrive at more meaningful interpretation of interactive terms.  Also, a more 
sophisticated model is needed to increase the reliability of the findings.  Second, it should 
defragment nation-building concept into individual components and test their individual 
influence on political rights and civil liberties.  Third, forecasting models should be developed to 
enable policymakers to: (1) identify variables that are important in promoting greater political 
rights and civil liberties in such countries; (2) classify variables in accordance with their impact 
on nation-building at the immediate, transition, and consolidation phases of this process.  Such 
forecasting models could potentially facilitate policymakers to calibrate their policies as to 
maximize their effect on desired outcomes, and to focus on the implementation of appropriate 
policies at the proper phase of the nation-building process.  
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List of Nation-Building Missions, 1972-1999 
 
Country Name Country Code Years of  
Nation-Building 
Nation-Builder 
Albania 339 1997-1999 - OSCE - 
Angola 540 1991-1999 UN - - 
Belarus 370 1998-1999 - OSCE - 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 346 1995-1999 UN OSCE - 
Brunei 835 1972-1984 - - UK 
Cambodia 811 1992-1993 UN - - 
Central African Republic 482 1998-1999 UN - - 
Congo (Kinshasa) 490 1999 UN - - 
Croatia 344 1996-1999 UN OSCE - 
East Timor 860 1999 UN - - 
El Salvador 92 1991-1995 UN - - 
Estonia 366 1993-1999 - OSCE - 
Georgia 372 1992-1999 UN OSCE - 
Grenada 55 1983-1985 - - USA 
Haiti 41 1993-1999 UN - - 
Kazakhstan 705 1998-1999 - OSCE - 
Kyrgyzstan 703 1998-1999 - OSCE - 
Latvia 367 1993-1999 - OSCE - 
Lebanon 660 1982-1984 - - USA 
Liberia 450 1993-1997 UN - - 
Maldives 781 1972-1976 - - UK 
Moldova 359 1993-1999 - OSCE - 
Mozambique 541 1992-1994 UN - - 
Namibia 565 1990 UN - - 
Panama 95 1989-1995 - - USA 
Russia 365 1995-1998 - OSCE - 
Rwanda 517 1993-1996 UN - - 
Sierra Leone 451 1998-1999 UN - - 
Solomon Islands 940 1978 - - UK 
Somalia 520 1993-1995 UN - - 
Tajikistan 702 1994-1999 UN OSCE - 
Turkmenistan 701 1998-1999 - OSCE - 
Ukraine 369 1994-1999 - OSCE - 
Uzbekistan 704 1995-1999 - OSCE - 
Yugoslavia 345 1992-1993; 1998-1999 UN OSCE - 










List of Third-Party Military Interventions, 1972-1999 
 










































Afghanistan 700 1979 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Afghanistan 700 1980 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Afghanistan 700 1981 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Afghanistan 700 1983 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Afghanistan 700 1984 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Afghanistan 700 1985 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Afghanistan 700 1986 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Afghanistan 700 1987 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Afghanistan 700 1988 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Afghanistan 700 1989 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Angola 540 1975 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Angola 540 1976 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Angola 540 1977 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Angola 540 1978 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Angola 540 1979 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Angola 540 1980 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Angola 540 1982 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Angola 540 1985 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Angola 540 1987 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Angola 540 1988 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Angola 540 1990 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Angola 540 1993 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
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Angola 540 1995 1 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Angola 540 1998 1 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Azerbaijan 373 1991 1 3 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Azerbaijan 373 1992 1 3 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Azerbaijan 373 1993 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Azerbaijan 373 1994 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Bosnia 346 1992 1 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Bosnia 346 1993 1 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Bosnia 346 1994 1 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Bosnia 346 1995 1 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Bosnia 346 1996 1 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Bosnia 346 1997 1 3 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Bosnia 346 1998 1 3 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Bosnia 346 1999 1 3 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Burma 775 1973 0 1 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Burundi 516 1972 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Burundi 516 1996 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Cambodia 811 1972 0 2 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Cambodia 811 1973 0 2 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Cambodia 811 1978 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Cambodia 811 1979 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Cambodia 811 1980 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Cambodia 811 1981 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Cambodia 811 1982 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Cambodia 811 1983 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Cambodia 811 1984 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Cambodia 811 1985 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Cambodia 811 1986 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
 47










































Cambodia 811 1988 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Cambodia 811 1989 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Cambodia 811 1992 1 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Cambodia 811 1993 1 4 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Cambodia 811 1994 1 4 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Chad 483 1978 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Chad 483 1979 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Chad 483 1980 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Chad 483 1981 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Chad 483 1983 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Chad 483 1984 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Chad 483 1986 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Chad 483 1987 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Chad 483 1991 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Chad 483 1992 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Colombia 100 1989 1 5 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Colombia 100 1990 1 5 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Colombia 100 1993 1 6 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Congo (Brazzaville) 484 1996 1 4 4 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Congo (Brazzaville) 484 1997 1 1 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Congo (Brazzaville) 484 1998 1 1 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Congo (Kinshasa) 490 1977 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Congo (Kinshasa) 490 1978 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Congo (Kinshasa) 490 1979 0 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Cyprus 352 1974 0 4 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Djibouti 522 1991 1 2 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Djibouti 522 1992 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Djibouti 522 1994 1 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
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El Salvador 92 1980 0 3 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
El Salvador 92 1981 0 4 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
El Salvador 92 1982 0 4 3 1 0 1 1 0 0 
El Salvador 92 1984 0 5 3 1 0 1 1 0 0 
El Salvador 92 1985 0 6 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
El Salvador 92 1986 0 5 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
El Salvador 92 1987 0 5 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
El Salvador 92 1990 1 5 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
El Salvador 92 1991 1 5 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Ethiopia 530 1977 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Ethiopia 530 1978 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Ethiopia 530 1979 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Ethiopia 530 1980 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Gambia 420 1981 0 5 4 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Georgia 372 1992 1 4 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Georgia 372 1993 1 3 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Georgia 372 1994 1 3 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Georgia 372 1995 1 4 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Georgia 372 1996 1 4 4 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Georgia 372 1997 1 5 4 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Georgia 372 1998 1 5 4 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Georgia 372 1999 1 5 4 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Grenada 55 1983 0 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Guatemala 90 1977 0 5 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Guatemala 90 1981 0 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Guatemala 90 1983 0 2 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Guatemala 90 1984 0 3 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Guatemala 90 1990 1 5 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
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Guatemala 90 1994 1 4 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Guinea-Bissau 404 1998 1 5 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Guinea-Bissau 404 1999 1 5 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Haiti 41 1994 1 3 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Haiti 41 1995 1 3 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Haiti 41 1996 1 4 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Haiti 41 1997 1 4 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Haiti 41 1998 1 3 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Haiti 41 1999 1 3 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
India 750 1990 1 6 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 
India 750 1991 1 5 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
India 750 1993 1 4 4 1 0 1 0 0 1 
India 750 1994 1 4 4 1 1 0 0 1 0 
India 750 1996 1 6 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
India 750 1998 1 6 5 1 0 1 0 0 1 
India 750 1999 1 6 5 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Indonesia 850 1999 1 4 4 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Iran 630 1979 0 3 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Iraq 645 1974 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Iraq 645 1975 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Iraq 645 1983 0 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Iraq 645 1986 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Iraq 645 1987 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Iraq 645 1991 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Iraq 645 1992 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Iraq 645 1993 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Iraq 645 1994 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Iraq 645 1996 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
 50










































Iraq 645 1997 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Laos 812 1972 0 3 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Liberia 450 1990 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Liberia 450 1991 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Liberia 450 1992 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Liberia 450 1993 1 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Liberia 450 1994 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Liberia 450 1995 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Mali 432 1992 1 6 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Mauritania 435 1975 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Mauritania 435 1977 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Mauritania 435 1978 0 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Moldova 359 1992 1 3 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Moldova 359 1993 1 3 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Moldova 359 1994 1 4 4 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Moldova 359 1995 1 4 4 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Moldova 359 1996 1 5 4 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Moldova 359 1997 1 5 4 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Moldova 359 1998 1 6 4 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Moldova 359 1999 1 6 4 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Morocco 600 1975 0 3 3 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Morocco 600 1976 0 3 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Mozambique 541 1980 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Mozambique 541 1981 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Mozambique 541 1982 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Mozambique 541 1983 0 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Mozambique 541 1984 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Mozambique 541 1985 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
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Mozambique 541 1986 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Mozambique 541 1987 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Nicaragua 93 1978 0 3 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Nicaragua 93 1982 0 2 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Nicaragua 93 1983 0 2 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Nicaragua 93 1984 0 3 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Nicaragua 93 1985 0 3 3 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Nicaragua 93 1986 0 3 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Nicaragua 93 1988 0 3 4 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Oman 698 1972 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Oman 698 1973 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Oman 698 1974 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Oman 698 1975 0 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Pakistan 770 1975 0 3 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Peru 135 1984 0 6 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Peru 135 1985 0 6 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Peru 135 1987 0 6 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Peru 135 1990 1 5 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Peru 135 1991 1 5 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Philippines 840 1977 0 3 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Philippines 840 1985 0 4 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Philippines 840 1990 1 5 5 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Philippines 840 1991 1 5 5 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Rwanda 517 1990 1 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Rwanda 517 1992 1 2 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Rwanda 517 1993 1 2 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Rwanda 517 1994 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Sierra Leone 451 1997 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
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Sierra Leone 451 1998 1 5 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Sierra Leone 451 1999 1 5 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Somalia 520 1982 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Somalia 520 1983 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Somalia 520 1987 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Somalia 520 1988 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Somalia 520 1989 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Somalia 520 1992 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Somalia 520 1993 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
South Africa 560 1977 0 3 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
South Africa 560 1979 0 3 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 
South Africa 560 1985 0 3 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Sri Lanka 780 1984 0 5 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Sri Lanka 780 1985 0 5 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Sri Lanka 780 1987 0 5 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Sri Lanka 780 1988 0 5 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Sri Lanka 780 1989 1 4 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Sri Lanka 780 1990 1 4 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Sudan 625 1984 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Sudan 625 1987 0 4 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Sudan 625 1991 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Sudan 625 1992 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Sudan 625 1997 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Tajikistan 702 1993 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Tajikistan 702 1994 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Tajikistan 702 1995 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Tajikistan 702 1996 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 
Thailand 800 1972 0 1 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 
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Thailand 800 1979 0 4 4 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Thailand 800 1985 0 5 4 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Turkey 640 1994 1 3 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Uganda 500 1972 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Uganda 500 1979 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Uganda 500 1981 0 4 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Uganda 500 1982 0 4 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Uganda 500 1984 0 4 3 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Uganda 500 1985 0 3 4 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Yugoslavia 345 1998 1 2 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Yugoslavia 345 1999 1 3 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Zimbabwe 552 1974 0 2 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Zimbabwe 552 1975 0 2 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Zimbabwe 552 1976 0 2 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Zimbabwe 552 1977 0 2 3 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Zimbabwe 552 1978 0 3 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 
Zimbabwe 552 1979 0 4 4 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Zimbabwe 552 1982 0 4 3 1 1 0 0 1 0 
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